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Abstract
Electronic cash is arguably one of the most important applications of modern cryptology.
There have been two types of electronic cash schemes namely on-line and o-line. In general
o-line schemes are more ecient than on-line ones. The two fundamental issues with any
o-line electronic cash scheme have been the detection of double spending and provision of
anonymity. These issues make the design of secure o-line electronic cash schemes not an easy
task. Cut-and-choose technology was one of the rst techniques that was introduced to address
the issue of double spending in an o-line scheme. However, this technique is not very ecient.
Subsequently, other techniques had been proposed to achieve both double spending and client
anonymity without using the cut and choose method. These include the works of Brands based on
the discrete logarithm and that of Ferguson based on RSA and polynomial secret sharing scheme.
In this paper, we propose an improved version of o-line electronic cash scheme based on the
Ferguson’s protocol. This scheme improves the eciency by making some of the parameters
used in the protocol to be reusable and removes the risk of framing by the bank by hiding the
client’s identity. c© 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The most widely used model for electronic payment schemes involves three dierent
parties, namely a bank, clients and vendors. The life cycle of a generic electronic coin
involves all the parties. First, a client withdraws the coin from the bank. The client
then sends the coin to a vendor in exchange for some goods and services. Finally,
the vendor completes the cycle when s=he deposits the coin at the bank. There are
three distinct phases in this cycle namely the withdrawal, payment and deposit phases,
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respectively. Prior to these, we have the account opening phase where a user’s account
is registered with the bank.
Broadly speaking, there are two dierent types of electronic cash schemes. The rst
type is an on-line electronic cash, in which the payment and deposit phases occur in
the same transaction. In other words, every coin is veried by the bank at the time
of payment. This requires the bank to be on-line for every coin exchanged between
the clients and the vendors. The second type of scheme is an o-line electronic cash
scheme. In this type, the bank does not have to be involved in any payment transactions.
Instead, the coins are veried after the transaction at some convenient time for both
vendors and the bank. Clearly, o-line electronic payment schemes are more ecient
and economical than on-line payment ones.
In the case of o-line electronic payment, as the coins are not veried at the time of
payment, there is a potential for dishonest clients to double spend any of their coins.
This is because digital cash is easy to copy, which is essentially a set of numbers.
Another requirement that can arise in electronic coins is the need for anonymity, that
is, the privacy of the clients may need to be protected. Anonymity and double-spending
requirements make the design of secure ecient electronic payment schemes not an
easy task.
Cut-and-choose technology was introduced in [3] as a way of addressing the double-
spending problem in o-line anonymous electronic cash. Informally, each coin is con-
structed as k sets of two numbers. Given any two numbers in the same set, anyone
can compute the identity of the coin owner (the client); if only one number in each set
is known regardless of the number of sets involved, it is computationally infeasible to
identify the client. When the client wishes to spend the coin to a vendor, the client has
to reveal k dierent numbers, one from each set. The set of these numbers is normally
referred to as the response, which is chosen blindly and randomly by the vendor. If the
client double spends any coin, the bank can eventually obtain two dierent numbers in
the same set for the double-spent coin. This reveals the identity of the client. However,
this technique is highly inecient in terms of the data exchanged between the clients
and the vendors during each payment as each coin contains 2k dierent numbers of
reasonably large size.
Subsequent to the original proposal, several improvements and new constructions
have been proposed; see for instance, [1, 2, 5{7, 9, 12]. Notably, the works of Brands [1]
and Ferguson [5] achieve both double-spending detection and client anonymity without
using the cut-and-choose method. In these schemes, there is only one challenge needed
for each coin in the payment phase, which is a signicant improvement compared to the
original proposal by Chaum [3]. Brands’ protocol relies on the representation problem
which is regarded as the optimal Discrete Logarithm based solution for anonymous
electronic cash. Nevertheless, as RSA has almost become an industry de-facto standard,
it is desirable to design an ecient anonymous electronic cash scheme based on the
RSA system. The only RSA-based solution proposed so far is the Ferguson’s protocol.
Ferguson’s protocol uses a polynomial secret sharing scheme [11] to achieve double-
spending detection. When paying a coin to a vendor, the client gives a share of her
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identity in response to a random challenge. If the client spends the same coin twice,
she has to give two dierent shares, which will allow the bank to recover her identity
based on a polynomial secret sharing scheme where the degree of the polynomial is one.
This solution eliminates the use of cut-and-choose method, but the protocol needs three
dierent numbers A; B; C to hide the polynomial for each coin. These numbers must be
distinct and must only be known to the client and must be blindly signed by the bank.
The bank must also play an active role in computing the values of A; B; C. Otherwise,
the client can use two identical sets of A; B; C for two dierent coins. This can lead to
the risk of not detecting the double spent coins. To meet these requirements, complex
computations and communications between the clients and the bank are needed when
the clients withdraw money from the bank. In fact, Ferguson himself acknowledges the
ineciency of the withdrawal phase in his paper. Moreover, in Ferguson’s proposal,
the bank must know the client’s secret identity, which allows the bank to frame any
client at its will.
In this paper, we propose an o-line electronic cash scheme that improves the e-
ciency of Ferguson’s protocol. In our improved scheme, the set of numbers A; B; C is
made reusable. That is, it is xed for every coin. This eliminates the need for the bank
to compute some portion of A; B; C which in turn leads to a simpler protocol design.
Unlike the Ferguson’s protocol, our scheme removes the risk of framing by the bank.
2. Ferguson’s protocol
In Ferguson’s protocol [5], the three main players are the Client, the Vendor and the
Bank. Each coin in the payment system is represented by three numbers, A=fa(a);
B=fb(b) and C =fc(c), where f(:) functions are suitable one way functions (not
hash functions). The client also gets two RSA-signatures from the bank: (CUA)1=v and
(CkB)1=v, where (v; 1=v) is the bank public=secret key pair, U is the client’s identity
and k is a random number which is unique for each coin.
When the client wants to pay the coin (A; B; C), she sends the vendor the values
of a,b and c. The vendor replies with a randomly chosen challenge x. The client
then sends r :=Ux + k and the signature (CrAxB)1=v, which can be computed from
((CUA)1=v)
x
(CkB)1=v. The vendor in turn can easily verify the consistency of these two
responses. At the end of the day or at some convenient time, the vendor sends a, b,
c, the challenge and the response to the bank. If the client sends the same coin twice,
for two dierent challenges x and x0, the bank has Ux + k and Ux0 + k, which reveal
the client’s identity U .
However, the problem of withdrawal phase remains. In the withdrawal phase, the
client must get the signature on CUA and CkB from the bank, while the bank learns
nothing about a; b, c and k. Moreover, the bank also has to ensure that a; b; c are not
the same for any two distinctive coins. Otherwise, two dierent clients can obtain the
bank signatures on two distinct coins as
[(CU1A)1=v; (Ck1B)1=v]; [(CU2A)1=v; (Ck2B)1=v];
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where k1; k2 are two randomly chosen numbers and U1; U2 are the identities of these
two clients, respectively. Now they can spend three dierent coins generated from the
data of two coins:
[(CU1A)1=v; (Ck1B)1=v]; [(CU2A)1=v; (Ck2B)1=v]; [(CU2A)1=v; (Ck1B)1=v]:
At the end of the day, the bank only has U1x1 + k1; U2x2 + k2; U2x3 + k1; x1; x2; x3.
These are inadequate to compute either k1; k2 or U1; U2.
In order to solve the problem, Ferguson proposed that three numbers A; B; C should
be in the following form:
C = cgf(h
c
c)
c ;
A= agf(a)a ;
B= bgf(h
b
b)
b ;
where the numbers gc; ga and gb are known to public and are of large order in Zn,
and hc and hb are two random numbers. The withdrawal protocol for this particular
set A; B; C is rather complicated and hence is dicult to verify. To withdraw a coin,
the client needs to use six blind factors and perform around 20 exponential computa-
tions. Use of many blind signatures makes it dicult to verify. Also, the bank must
know the client’s secret identity U , which enables the bank to frame any particular
client.
3. Preliminaries
Let us now consider the operations required in the description of our schemes in
this section.
3.1. Modulo v
In our scheme, unless explicitly mentioned otherwise, all computations involving
exponents are done under modulo v, where (v; 1=v) are the bank’s RSA-based public
key and secret key pairs. For any number w, letting =wmod v and =w div v implies
that w= + v.
Lemma 1. An user Alice can construct the bank signature on gw if Alice has the
bank’s signature S 0=(g)1=vmod n.
Proof. Given (g)1=v, Alice can compute
S = (g)1=vg
= (g)1=v(g)v1=v
= (ggv)1=v
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= (g+v)1=v
= (gw)1=vmod n;
which is the bank’s signature on gw.
Using similar transformation, it is easy to prove that given [; gw; gw div v], another
user Bob can verify that =wmod v but he learns nothing about the structure of w.
For instance, if w=Uy, Bob will not be able to nd U or y. If (gw)1=v is given,
instead of gw, Bob is also able to verify that g is indeed authorised by the bank.
We assume that all the computations involving exponents are done under modulo v
and that the necessary correction has been applied to the resulting messages. These
arguments are also implicitly assumed by Ferguson in his original paper but has not
been clearly described.
3.2. RSA-based witness hiding protocols
Suppose, Alice sends m= g1=k mod vmod n to Bob, where g is known to both Bob and
Alice. Alice now wants to prove that she knows k for the given m. Alice and Bob can
therefore run the following protocol:
Protocol P1:
1: Alice generates a random number r and sends h=mr to Bob
2: Bob generates a random challenge c and sends c to Alice.
3: Alice computes w= r + c=k and returns w to Bob.
4: Bob veries that mw = hgcmod n. If the equation holds, then Bob accepts the proof.
Lemma 2 (Completeness). If Alice follows the correct procedures and mw = hgc then
w is the correct response for the challenge c.
Lemma 3 (Soundness). For any challenge c; unless Alice knows k; she cannot produce
a correct w.
Now suppose Alice wants to prove to Bob that she knows k for a given pair
[M = gU=k ; m= g1=k ], where g is public and gU is Alice’s identity. Alice and Bob can
proceed as follows:
Protocol P2:
1. Alice chooses a random number r, computes h=mr , H =Mr and sends them to
Bob.
2. Bob chooses a random challenge c and sends it to Alice.
3. Alice computes w= r + c=k and returns w to Bob.
4. Bob veries that mw = hgc and Mw =H (gU )c. If both equations hold, the proof is
correct.
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Using Lemmas 1 and 2, we can also prove that the protocol P2 is complete and
sound. In fact P1 is a variant of Schnorr identication protocol [10] and P2 is a variant
of Chaum and Pedersen [4] interactive signature protocol for a composite modulo n.
Further discussions can also be found in [8].
For the sake of simplicity, in the rest of this paper, let P1(k; g) and P2(k; g; gU )
denote the process for proving the knowledge of k for given [g1=k ]; [g1=k ; gU=k ] using
protocols P1 and P2, respectively. Note that in both these protocols, we have omitted
the factor modulo v.
4. The new protocol
The central idea in our protocol is that for each coin the client sends to the vendor
two numbers,  and , where =(U + y)x + k and =Uy, rather than sending
=Ux + k. If the client double spends the coin, the bank (at the end of the day)
will receive two dierent responses =(U + y)x + k and 0=(U + y)x0 + k, which
will allow the bank to obtain the client’s identity. This is done by solving equations:
U + y=( − 0)=(x − x0) and =Uy. By introducing y, we no longer need to use
dierent sets of A; B; C for dierent coins.
To simplify our presentation, let us denote the bank as B, a generic vendor as V
and a generic client as C.
4.1. System setup
To setup the system, B chooses a large RSA common modulus n and its two
RSA public=secret key pairs (3; 1=3) and (v; 1=v), where v is a large prime number.
B also selects a suitable one-way collision-free hash function h(), a random number
g relatively prime to n and four random numbers wa; wb; wc, and wd, each relatively
prime to (n). B then computes A= gwa ; B= gwb ; C = gwc , and D= gwd (all under
modulus n). Finally, B broadcasts n; v; h(); g; A; B; C; D as public information.
4.2. Account opening phase
Both C and V need to have an account at the bank B. We assume that V has had
an account at the bank and is legitimate to use the electronic payment service run by
the bank. The client C opens an account at the bank using the following protocol:
1. C chooses a number U at random and sends I = gU mod n along with her real
identity such as her name to B.
2. Upon receipt of I; B computes:
a= IwaB= gwaUB=AUBmod n
b= IwbC = gwbUC =BUC mod n
3. B sends a; b to C and stores (I; a; b) as C’s identity and I as the bank account
number of C.
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Assuming the diculty of computing discrete logarithm, knowing I , the bank cannot
obtain U which is known only to the client. However, U can be discovered by the
bank if C double spends the same coin. We will show how this is achieved when we
consider the security of the scheme in Section 5.
4.3. Coin withdrawal phase
To withdraw a coin from the bank B, the client C rst needs to identify herself to
B by sending B her name without releasing the information U . Then B and C follow
the protocol given below (See also Fig. 1):
Stage 1:
1. C chooses two random numbers: y and k, and computes
gY = gU=y mod n; gy = g1=y mod n; Dk =D1=k mod n
and sends them to B. The account number is gY =gy = I .
2. C then proves to B that she knows y and k such that
gyY = g
U ; gyy = g; D
k
k =D
by carrying out P1(k; D), P2(y; g; gU ) with B.
3. If the proofs hold, B signs two messages [agwbY g
wc
y ], [BDk ] as
s01 = (ag
wb
Y g
wc
y )
1=v; s02 = (BDk)
1=v
and returns both signatures to C.
4. C in turn raises s01, s
0
2 to the power of y, k, respectively, to obtain
s1 = s
0y
1 = (a
yb)1=v; s2 = s0k2 = (B
kD)1=v:
C also veries the signatures. If they are correct, C proceeds to the next stage. Essen-
tially the rst stage is used to obtain the bank signature on ayb and BkD.
Stage 2:
1. C computes a message m constructed as m= h(Uymod vkaybkBkD) and sends a
blinded version m0= r3m to B.
2. B signs the blinded message m0 and returns the signature s0=m01=3 to C.
3. C removes the blind factor r from s0 to have s=m1=3.
After the withdrawal, C stores fy; k; s; s1; s2g as the representation of each coin with-
drawal.
Lemma 4 (Completeness). If C follows the procedure correctly; then s1 and s2 are
indeed the bank signatures on ayb and BkD; respectively.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Because gwbY =(g
U=y)
wb =BU=y and gwcy =C
1=y
s01 = (aB
U=yC1=y)
1=v
=(ab1=y)
1=v
:
Therefore s1 = s
0y
1 = [(ab
1=y)y]
1=v
=(ayb)1=v.
Using a similar computation, we have s2 = (BkD)
1=v
.
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C B
Stage 1:
y; k 2R Zv
gY = gU=y mod n
gy = g1=y mod n
Dk =D1=k mod n
Dk ; gy; gY−−−−−−−−−!
P1(k; D)
P2(y; g; gU )
s01 = [ag
wb
Y g
wc
y ]
1=vmod n
s02 = [BDk ]
1=vmod n
s01 ; s
0
2 −−−−−−−−−
s1 = s
0y
1 = (a
yb)1=vmod n
s2 = s0k2 = (B
kD)1=vmod n
Stage 2:
r 2Z
m1 = aybmod n
m2 =BkDmod n
m= h(Uymod vkm1km2) mod n
m0= r3m mod n
m0−−−−−−−−−!
s0=m01=3 mod n
s0 −−−−−−−−−
s= s0=r=m01=3 mod n
Fig. 1. Illustration of the coin withdrawal protocol.
Lemma 5 (Soundness). Using s01; C cannot generate a signature s1 that contains a
yb
with a single order of b other than (ayb)1=v. Similarly for s2. That is; using s02; C
cannot generate a signature s2 that contains BkD with a single order of D other than
(BkD)1=v.
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C V
x 2R Zv
x −−−−−−−−−
=Uymod v
=(U + y)x + k mod v
; ; s; s1 ; s2−−−−−−−−−! s3 = h(ksv1ksv2)mod n
S= (sx1s2)
vmod n
S= (AxBCxD)
v
mod n
Fig. 2. Illustration of the payment protocol.
Proof. As the proofs for both s1 and s2 are very similar, we only give the proof for
the signature s1.
Suppose that C can generate a signature that is in the form of s1 = (aybc)
1=v for
some c. As s01 = (ab
y)1=v and s1 is generated as s1 = s
0y+r
1 for some r, it means that
s0y+r1 = (a
ybc)1=v or (ab1=y)rv= c
However, in the payment phase, C must prove that s1 must contain only a single
order of b (the proof is given below). That is, c contains no order of b. In another
words, C must convert br to some order of base A; B; C; D, which is regarded as the
hard discrete log problem.
4.4. Payment phase
Once the client obtains a legitimate coin signed by the bank, she can spend it with
a vendor. The following protocol describes the payment process (see also Fig. 2):
1. V generates a random challenge x and sends it to C. The challenge should be
unique for each transaction; for instance, it can be computed as x= h(VkDatek
Timek   ).
2. Upon the receipt of x, C computes a response consisting of two numbers, =Uy
and =(U + y)x + k, and sends them to V along with s, s1 and s2.
3. Upon the receipt of the information sent by C in step 2, V needs to check the
bank’s signature on the coin. V accepts the coin if and only if s3 = h(ksv1ksv2) and
(s1x  s2)v=AxBCxDmod n.
Lemma 6 (Completeness). If C follows the protocol, the coin is legitimate; that is;
the coin is in the correct form.
Proof. This is because
S= [((ayb)1=v)
x
(BkD)
1=v
]v
= (ayb)xBkD
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= ((AUB)
y
(BUC))
x
BkD
= AUyxB(U+y)x+kCxD
= ABCxD:
Lemma 7 (Soundness). S=AxBCxD will hold if and only if s1 = (ayb)1=v and s2 =
(BkD)
1=v
.
Proof. As S contains only a single order of D regardless of the value of x, D must
come from s2. Moreover, because S=AxBCxD, s2 must have only a single order
of D, that is, s2 must be in the form of BkD according to Lemma 4. Similarly as S
contains Cx, we also have s1 in the form of ayb. Hence s1 = (ayb)1=v and s2 = (BkD)
1=v
must hold if the coin is legitimate.
4.5. Deposit phase
Once the client has paid, the deposit of the coin (or coins) can happen at any
convenient time such as at the end of the day. V deposits the coin received from C at
B by sending (x; ; ; s; s1; s2). B performs exactly the same verication process as V
did in the payment phase. If everything is OK, B pays an equivalent value of money
to V and stores (x; ; ; s) to help detect double-spending.
4.6. Discussion
This section examines the security and eciency aspects of the proposed protocol.
Coin forgery: Each coin in this protocol as seen by the vendor is given as f; ; s; s1;
s2g, where s= [h(ksv1ksv2)]1=3 mod n. Creating (h(r))dmod n for any value of r is infea-
sible unless d or the factorisation of n is known; these are only known to B. Moreover
in the payment phase, C also proves that s1 and s2 are in fact in the correct form.
This proof is also checked by the bank in the deposit phase. So even if both client
and vendor collude, it is still not possible to forge coins in the proposed protocol. In
fact, in our protocol, even the bank cannot forge a coin against any client, because the
secret identity U is known only to C. This is dierent from Ferguson’s protocol.
Double spending detection: A double spending can be detected if the bank receives
two identical coins. Due to the anonymity in the protocol, when a client does not
double spend a coin, the client’s identity is not revealed to any other parties including
the bank. When the bank nds two identical coins in its database, it can compute
the particular client’s (or coin owner’s) secret identity and then can use the mapping
between the secret identity and the name of the client. The process of nding the secret
identity of the client when double spending occurs is as follows:
1. With double spending, B has two dierent responses =(U+y)x+k and 0=(U+
y)x0 + k for two dierent challenges x and x0 provided by the vendor. This will
immediately allow the bank to determine U + y. As the bank also has =Uy, it
can easily calculate U .
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2. After obtaining U , the bank computes gU and then nds the mapping in its client’s
identity list. Once a match is found, the client’s name can be found. The evidence
is undeniable since U is client’s secret information which cannot be found unless
the client double spends a coin.
Transaction untraceability: For each coin, the client only has to reveal Uy, (U +
y)x+k, ByD, axb (equivalent to AUyBU+yD). All this information only allows the bank
to compute gUy, gU+y and Uy, which is a slightly dierent version of a well-known
intractable problem: given gU , gy, nd gUy. The client’s anonymity is achieved, since
U cannot be calculated. For each dierent coin, the values of y; k are dierent; hence
it is infeasible to nd a link among the used coins. This feature provides transaction
untraceability.
4.7. Comparison with Ferguson’s protocol
Eciency: The two stages of the withdrawal phase can be done in parallel in practice.
This is also applicable to the two protocols P1(k; D) and P2(y; g; gU ) executed in the
withdrawal phase. With these optimizations, the withdrawal phase can be achieved in
four steps.
In comparison with Ferguson’s protocol, our withdrawal phase is computationally
more ecient. Clients generate only three blind factors and perform around nine dis-
crete exponential computations compared with six blind factors and around 20 expo-
nential computations in Ferguson’s protocol. Our payment protocol is also ecient.
The client only has to perform one extra operation (=Uy) which is independent of
the challenge x and hence can be done at any time by the client.
Security: One extra security feature in the proposed protocol is that our protocol
removes the risk of framing by the bank. In Ferguson’s protocol, the bank knows
the client’s secret information U and hence it can frame the client. In our protocol,
this is not normally possible because the bank only has gU but not U . The bank can
only nd U if the client double spends a coin. Furthermore, the withdrawal protocol
in Ferguson’s scheme is dicult to verify. In this paper, we have also shown the
completeness and soundness of our scheme.
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